In this essay I discuss the political economy of data-driven platforms in terms of monopolies and monopsonies, arguing that the concentration of buying and selling power builds on and extends a pseudoomniscient data architecture that feeds on an increasingly seamless data ecosystem. As the mathematical underpinnings of data-driven architectures are further extended into the hardware of smart homes, driverless cars and smart cities, they may at some point diminish or eradicate the semantic discontinuity that provides room for dissent and dissonance. Such discontinuity depends on a text-driven environment, whose affordances such as dissonance and adversariality cannot be taken for granted in the pervasive data ecosystem that drives the political economy of platforms. I contend that we need a small set of primitives of legal protection to shoot holes in the semantic continuity that is generated by the backend systems of data-driven platforms; competition law, consumer law, and tort law cannot contribute to the effective contestability of algorithmic decision-making by themselves. They require effective and practical rights to data minimization and purpose limitation and an actionable right to not be subject to automated decisions without a contestable justification. Once these primitives of legal protection are operational both the pseudo-omniscient nature of data architectures and the seamless nature of data ecosystems will be ruptured, thus reinstating the interstices for innovation, and for meaningful individual and political self-determination. 
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DATA-DRIVEN PLATFORMS
The concern regarding platforms centers around their potential for monopolistic or totalitarian behavior. The lack of viable competitors not only disturbs the supposedly beneficial operations of a free market, it also exposes the users of such platforms to potentially monopolistic governance, leading them to accept terms of service across a number of services which leave these users vulnerable to unwarranted exposure and manipulation. Even if a platform does not intend to use its quasi-sovereign powers to actually institute a quasi-totalitarian rule across the many contexts we navigate, we should be concerned about its potential to do so. The difference between enlightened sovereign absolutism in 17 th and 18 th Century Europe and the institution of the Rule of Law in subsequent centuries was not that enlightened sovereigns did not mean well, but that we decided to subject their power to countervailing powers, while instituting democratic self-government. We, the people, want to decide for ourselves what we consider good or bad government. Such selfdetermination becomes even more critical as data-driven platforms have the potential to manipulate individual preferences and disrupt public opinion, underlining the need for a radical reconfiguration of the current data ecosystem. Though the 'revelations' about microtargeting by firms such as Cambridge Analytica, claiming to use "data to change audience behavior" 1 should not surprise anybody, 2 the uproar also nicely demonstrates the acuity of human audiences when confronted with the extent to which they may have been "played." 3 The time has come to redress the market power of oversized platforms (dinosaurs suffering from 1 YOU (2011) . Though both methods may be effective in the short term, I believe that human interaction is far too complex to predict, notably due to the anticipation of potential predictions that human interaction incorporates (coined 'double contingency'). data obesity and pattern obesity), while addressing the root of the problem at the level of data-driven societal infrastructures.
A. What Is a Platform?
This essay refers to platforms whose functionality, power, and affordances depend on the data-driven architecture they embody, and on the data-driven ecosystem they enable and configure. Data-driven platforms are neither mere corporations nor states, nor are they mere technical scaffolding. 4 They afford both markets and political discourse, as with the Greek agora and the Roman forum. Both the agora and the forum originated as open spaces used for both commercial negotiation and political discourse. The Roman forum, however, achieved a certain elevation (it was in fact built on a platform) and turned into a more ceremonial, formal and enclosed terrain during the reign of the empire. 5 Whereas the agora underlines the equality of the Greek freemen, the forum became the site for a political architecture that separated the emperor and his entourage from his subjects.
As Gillespie notes, the term platform was originally used in the computational sense of "a technical base upon which other programs will run," while at some point, "[p]latforms are platforms not necessarily because they allow code to be written or run, but because they afford an opportunity to communicate, interact or sell."
6 As with the agora and the forum, the physical underpinnings of the site afford a mix of commercial transactions, artistic expression, and political discourse which highlights the role of data-driven platforms rather than their computational architecture. It is, however, the data-driven architecture and the data ecosystem it enables that determine what roles are possible and how they are distributed and constrained. This also relates to the question of whether these platforms are intermediaries (merely enabling content provision), media (responsible for the content itself) or-as Gillespie proposesmoderators 7 (tasked with safeguarding what I would call the civility or even "civicness" of online discourse, raising difficult questions about censure and the privatization of law enforcement). 8 However, the distinction between these three modi of platform behavior is becoming increasingly artificial, as platforms incorporate many other behaviors, functions, and roles, notably providing many of the services they must supposedly moderate. 9 This suggests that the framing of the questionwhether platforms are intermediaries, media or moderators-is mistaken and distracts attention from what should concern us; the potential for exposure and manipulation that is inherent in data-driven platforms.
Due to their distributed, networked, and data-driven architecture, platforms enable the construction of invasive, over-complete, statistically inferred, profiles of individuals (exposure), the spreading of fake content and fake accounts, the intervention of botfarms and malware as well as persistent AB testing, targeted advertising, and automated, targeted recycling of fake content (manipulation). In this essay, I refer to platforms as (1) layered technological architectures that enable data-driven applications based on various types of machine learning, and (2) as corporations that incorporate vertical and horizontal competitors into their own legal architecture. First, I explain the interplay between both types of platforms and then rearticulate the issue of platforms in terms of the semantic continuity they generate as the biggest threat to privacy as identity construction, 10 and to our capability to access, assess, redistribute, discuss, and rearticulate meaningful information. Finally, I propose a small set of primitives of legal protection as gatekeepers for a robust datadriven architecture that builds on and sustains a discontinuous polyphonic data ecosystem that allows for dissonance, dissent, and reinvention.
J. Monopolistic and Monopsistic Behaviors
By now, the term platform is often used to depict a new type of corporation that spreads its wings both horizontally and vertically to incorporate ever more data-driven services. This holds for the big five, GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft), but also for Twitter, for corporations involved in the sharing economy (Uber, 8 Tarleton Gillespie, Platforms are Not Intermediaries, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 198 (2018) . 9 The antitrust proceeding of the European Commission against Google is based on allegations that its moderation ended in an unfair trade practice. The indirect costs basically refer to the consequences of a business model that thrives on data-driven, behavioral advertising, geared towards nudging potential consumers into specific types of clickstream behaviors (thus generating revenue for the platform). As others have noted, 18 the reconfiguration of online platforms into sites that are conducive to making people click on advertisements has simultaneously reconfigured them for sentiment analysis, opinion mining, and nudging as to political opinion.
Second, platforms that enable the sharing economy broker between consumers on the one hand and a plethora of small, independent service providers on the other, may lower the price of such services for consumers, but simultaneously falsely turn employees into independent providers without any bargaining power, hiding market failure on the labor market: "Conversely, the principal objection to sharing economy platforms for traditional providers-their propensity to undercut on price-is unlikely to find purchase as a theory of harm. While sustained below-cost pricing is illegal, taking advantage of a lower cost base emphatically is not." 19 Third, the labor market is suffering from monopsony, i.e., anticompetitive concentration in a labor market where a few firms dominate hiring in that market. Whereas a monopoly concerns concentration in the seller's market (for instance, meaning that the sellers can set a high consumer price for the product or service), a monopsony concerns concentration in the buyer's market (for instance, meaning the buyers can set a low price for labor or work). "Antitrust enforcement is mainly concerned with consumer welfare, and hence the impacts of a lack of competition on product prices, not wages. 20 The basic idea of monopsony is that if employers don't have to compete with one another for workers, they can pay less, and workers will be stuck without the outside job offers that would enable them to claim higher wages. The monopsony story is consistent with a wide range of observed labor market phenomena: wage stagnation, declining geographic and job-to-job mobility . . . .
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If market failure on the side of the labor market is not redressed, consumers will, in the end, be worse off for the simple reason that most consumers are also employees or small independent service providers. Though consumer price may be said to go down (if one abstracts from the "price" paid in personal data), most consumers will see their wages stagnate or diminish, unless the legal framework enables courts to intervene, as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) did in its ruling on Uber, though this was not based on competition law but on EU legislation concerning the provision of transport services. n intermediation service such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the purpose of which is to connect, by means of a smartphone application and for remuneration, non-professional drivers using their own vehicle with persons who wish to make urban journeys, must be regarded as being inherently linked to a transport service and, accordingly, must be classified as 'a service in the field of transport' within the meaning of Article 58(1) TFEU. Consequently, such a service must be excluded from the scope of Article 56 TFEU, Directive 2006/123 and Directive 2000/31.") The CJEU C-434/15, 2017 E.C.R. 39, (Dec. 20, 2017) grounds its qualification of Uber's service as a "transport service" instead of merely "an information society service" on the fact that
[Uber] exercises decisive influence over the conditions under which [that] service is provided by those drivers. On the latter point, it appears, inter alia, that Uber determines at least the maximum fare by means of the eponymous application, that the company receives that amount from the client before paying part of it to the non-professional driver of the vehicle, and that it exercises a certain control over the quality of the vehicles, the drivers and their conduct, which can, in some circumstances, result in their exclusion.
K. The Matter of Concern: A Political Economy of Machinic Neoplatonism
The political economy of platforms thrives on a semi-totalitarian capture of behavioral data, 23 while the seamless access to such data informs the economic power of platforms due to the knowledge asymmetry it entails. Due to their dependence on data-driven decisionmaking, platforms are rooted in a worldview that is deeply mathematical, whether implicitly or explicitly. As McQuillan notes, this entails a type of neoplatonism; seeking reality in the mathematical functions that supposedly underlie human behavior. 24 Mark Zuckerberg has revealed that one of his focal interests is in finding the "fundamental mathematical law underlying human social relationships that governs the balance of who and what we all care about."
25 Though this may sound wildly off key to some, it actually refers to a key assumption of machine learning, which operates on the hypothesis that the mathematical functions by which datapoints are correlated are an approximation of mathematical laws that are believed to underlie patterns in real life. The latter belief forms the foundation of machine learning. Even if it were not true, it may become true if platforms base a plethora of machine-to-machine and machine-to-human decisions on the mathematical functions they elicit from the datapoints to which they have access. This is the machinic version of Merton's famous Thomas theorem: if machines define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences.
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Next to their online data-driven decision systems, most of the platforms are moving into the Internet of things, investing in cyberphysical infrastructures such as cloud robotics, connected cars, warehouse logistics, drones, smart homes, and smart cities. Insofar as such cyberphysical infrastructures are based on machine learning, they entail My concern is whether, and if so, how, the data-driven architecture of platforms can afford individual human flourishing, autonomy, meaningful choice, agonistic democratic decision making, fair distribution of risk and opportunities, and balanced growth of public and private welfare. This requires keen attention to the relationship between their technical and corporate architecture on the one hand and what Julie Cohen has described as semantic discontinuity on the other hand, 29 taking into account the mathematical underpinnings of their operations. The issue with platforms is that they have become constitutive of human society in a number of ways and will continue to reconfigure and reconstitute employment, education, political discourse and decision making, healthcare and medicine, and the supply and distribution of energy. 30 The extent to which everyday life has become rooted in an onlife world run by a set of global platforms raises the question to what extent our agency is being diminished, overruled and tweaked in function of a corporate profit that is based in the quest for ever more behavioral data to further approximate the mathematical functions that supposedly determine our interactions.
Platforms redefine the space (1) for generating new meaning, and (2) for experimenting and playing around with new ways of seeing the same thing. They also redefine (3) the space for resistance against old and new ways of addressing us as parents, employees, students, employers, passengers, drivers, consumers, citizens, or service providers. As a result of combining a seamless data-driven pseudo-omniscience with a sequence of market failures, we may be facing the loss of semantic discontinuity 31 that is key to a society that fosters and protects the capabilities of individual human beings, their participation in a viable democracy, and the checks and balances of an effective Rule of Law. 30 This is not to say that they will supply energy or provide healthcare; I am referring to the way they are reconfiguring the way energy usage and other critical infrastructure is managed (e.g., via Google's Nest). 31 COHEN, supra note 29.
II. SEMANTIC DISSONANCE IN THE ERA OF DATA-DRIVEN PLATFORMS
In her seminal work on the networked self, Julie Cohen discusses the protective potential of semantic discontinuity, demonstrating how it protects the practice (not merely the idea) of privacy, by offering interstitial spaces to reinvent the self. 32 Such reinvention is not a matter of voluntary sovereignty; the self is not the assumed neoliberal subject that goes around reinventing herself in the process of exercising her consumer choice, or in the process of enhancing her competitive advantages. Reinvention happens in the gaps and frictions between what people mean and how others "read" them, keeping in mind that meaning is always about actionable mutual expectations. 33 It matters what we mean and how we are read, because this orients our interactions and those of others. Cohen highlights the playful character of self-construction that depends on the freedom to give meaning to the world, the self, and to the choices one makes or cannot make. In that sense, freedom does not depend on operationalizing given preferences, but on developing and reconfiguring the skills to "make a life." It is about capabilities rather than mere opportunities. Taking Zizek to heart, we could say that "communication is a "successful misunderstanding. '" 34 To actually work, the misunderstanding must be successful; it must set things in motion. Complete congruity between intent and response is not given, and attempting to freeze them into conformity would result in a stalemate and erode the generative nature of incongruent understandings. It would thus limit the "hypotheses space" of human understanding, diminish human imagination, and thereby reduce our capability to find new ways of dealing with real world problems. It would, in the end, also stifle innovation.
A. Text-Driven Dissonance
Just like physical walls and other tangible barriers, the mutual expectations we call social norms and the institutions they sustain 35 can offer a kind of "natural" protection against invasive inquiry. More importantly, institutions and social norms can provide resilience against the imposition of meaning that rules out any kind of play. incremental as well as radical reinvention of the self. Though such material, social, and institutional resilience may be seen as "natural" as long as it is taken for granted (naturalized), the artificial character of institutions comes to the fore when less flexible computational constructs take over. Whereas our current institutions are largely contingent upon text-driven information and communication technologies (ICTs, namely the technologies of the word), 36 data-driven platforms may not share the affordances of technologies such as the printing press. 37 The latter induces a linear, sequential processing of information (i.e., from left to right, from top of the page to the bottom, from the first to the last page), while simultaneously forcing the reader to take note of a host of different viewpoints due to the proliferation of books written by authors with a variety of potentially contrarian perspectives. Text-driven ICTs, in point of fact, induce slow thinking (reflection), as well as a permanent anticipation of other ways of thinking the same things (imagination). The need for interpretation and the potential for adversarial behavior are baked into the affordances of written and printed text. Though we need not be naïve or romantic about the affordances of a text-driven society, both indepth reflection and complex abstraction have been attributed to the externalization of memory and the mediation of reasoning that is enabled by text (including both letters and numbers).
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In previous work I referred to the foundational poly-semantics of human language to explain the difference between machine translation and human translation. 39 Where machine translation thrives because the polysemantics can be "resolved" and reduced to a univocal decoding and recoding, human translation thrives when the poly-semantics of an expression in one language is transposed into the poly-semantics of another language, while remaining loyal to the original expression, taking 36 note that this can be done in multiple ways. 40 It is the notion of loyalty that is crucial here, and the awareness that such loyalty does not reduce to one necessarily best translation. It is such loyalty that distinguishes semantic dissonance from a false note. A translation can be developed in counterpoint to the original, but the potential for dissonance should not lead to disloyalty, which would imply that the original expression is taken for a ride in its alleged translation. Semantic dissonance is essential for a viable democracy, as it opens new ways of seeing the same thing, generating a larger repertoire for the framing of problems and the construction of solutions. As Ricoeur demonstrated in his work on the use of metaphor, 41 a successful and sustainable society thrives on the new insights that are generated in the interstices of stabilized meaning, noting that a new metaphor allows one to see the same thing from a different perspective and may even lead to seeing new "things". Whereas a false note is not tuned to other notes, the dissonant is; whereas the false note creates chaos, the dissonant creates tension. Dissonance thus adds two elements to the semantic discontinuity on which it depends. First, it is generative in its contrapuntal progression, enabling a coupling of consonance and dissonance that ties different melodies into a polyphonic movement. Second, it enables distinguishing productive (dissonance, polyphony) from destructive meaning generation (false notes, cacophony). This raises the pertinent question how much cacophony a society can support before breaking down into chaos, and when univocality will result in the weakness of a tyranny or totalitarian system that ignores opposition. Both questions are highly relevant for the reign of platforms. Do datadriven platforms reconfigure the balance between semantic continuity and discontinuity and the ensuing openings for dissonance and discord?
42 Does the architecture of cross-platform tracking and inferencing result in an overall continuity that may not even be semantic, but remains stuck at the level of machinic behaviors? Will the combination of exposure and Other than Gallacher suggests, this makes the difference even more interesting and the metaphor of dissonance even more crucial for generating meaning. Musical 'meaning' emerges on the nexus of the vertical (contrapuntal) and the horizontal (tonal), and it is the semantic discontinuity that is inherent in human language and human institutions that enables contrapuntal and tonal switches in human communication (both polyphonic and cacophonic) to shift from one melody to another, e.g., turning a false note into a dissonant. Vol 2.2 manipulability result in a loss of counterpoint, a lack of vital dissonance, and a monocultural equalization?
Semantic discontinuity affords dissonance. In that sense it is generative as it allows for shifts in meaning and for new meaning, regardless of intent. 43 At the same time it protects the self from overdetermination by the imposition of meaning by other humans or institutions; the affordances of text-driven institutional settings enable the self to develop other, potentially contrarian interpretations of words, phrases, institutional or legal norms different from those presented as obvious or final. The semantics of text are inherently poly-semantic; the ensuing contestability cannot be ruled out by force, even where acting on new interpretations may be prohibited or rendered impossible. It is not clear whether and how data-driven architectures have similar affordances. To the extent that the political economy of machinic neoplatonism drives platforms towards a web of contiguous data ecosystems which act on a buzzing stream of data-driven predictions, spaces for semantic dissonance may be seriously reduced or even closed.
A. Data-Driven Closure?
Though computing systems have unprecedented abilities to store bits and bytes and to calculate and correlate, their achievements are based on simulation rather than invention. Machine learning is not a matter of reasoning but of inductive calculation, of translating the relationship between input and output data into a mathematical target function that supposedly underlies the relationship between human experience and human judgment. 44 Basically, data-driven systems parasite on the expertise of domain experts to engage in what is essentially an imitation game. 45 There is nothing wrong with that, unless we wrongly assume that 43 49 MIND 433 (1950) . This is less obvious in the case of Alphazero, where the system is trained exclusively by playing against itself, based on a generic reinforcement learning algorithm. But, Alphazero has a very restricted and unambiguous task, even if the calculations it needs to perform are massive and complex; it does very well in a closed, rule-based game. In that sense it has no general artificial intelligence and cannot "survive" or even advise outside the confines of a rule-based game. the system can do without the acuity of human judgment, mistaking the imitation for what is imitated. 46 This is particularly concerning where platforms move into hardware, reconfiguring our built environment into a cyberphysical infrastructure that determines the "choice architecture" we face in everyday life-further erasing the difference between online and offline and further complicating our access to reality with a layer of backend systems that determine the hidden affordances of the interfaces. Google and Uber are moving into self-driving cars; Amazon has patented a wristband for its warehouse employees that enables monitoring their movements as well as prompting them into specific directions; 47 both are moving into smart homes and smart energy (Nesta, Alexa); Alphabet is moving into smart cities. 48 Thus, data-driven platforms are shaping the material world we navigate. In 1994, in the early days of the World Wide Web, Agre wrote a pioneering article about the way that computing systems 'capture' data, 49 implying a measure of violence as these systems force their environment (us) into the modus of data-engines, requiring a permanent translation of the flux of life into machine readable bits and bytes. In 2018, this translation is even more consequential. Due to their reliance on data-driven decision systems, platforms need ever more behavioral data and as they move into cyberphysical systems they will require a complete overhaul of existing infrastructure. Luciano Floridi notes in his book on the Fourth Revolution, 50 that in the practice of robotics the design of a robot's environment (called the envelop) is as important as the design of the robot itself. Rodney Brooks observes that driverless cars will require a number of transformations of our cityscapes: I think the popular interpretation is that driverless cars will simply replace cars with human drivers, one for one. (2014) not think that is going to happen at all. Instead our cities will be changed with special lanes for driverless cars, geofencing of where they can be and where cars driven by humans can be, a change in the norm for pick up and drop off location flexibility, changes to parking regulations, and in general all sorts of small incremental modifications to our cities. 51 Whereas Brooks suggests that such transformations are incremental, I believe that together with similar developments in energy grids, drone delivery, retail, healthcare, education and employment, our cityscapes, homes, offices, hospitals, schools, shops and factories will undergo major reinvention and reconfiguration. Cyberphysical infrastructures will require a major overhaul of our shared environment to ensure physical safety and to secure their functionality. This will entail both material scaffolding to protect human beings and further datafication to "optimize" the utility of these systems (at least for those who invest in them). As these systems will be driven by unprecedented amounts of machine-to-machine communications, while developing new types of dynamics once they start interacting (smart energy grids "talking" to connected electric cars; digital assistants for smart homes "exchanging notes" with each other in the cloud; artificial legal intelligence systems of law firms interacting with those of courts, public prosecutors and other law firms), we may expect a reduction of the interstices where semantic discontinuity would have developed in a text-driven environment. This does not necessarily mean that semantic discontinuity will be eradicated altogether; as long as we continue to speak, write, and read there will be ambiguity and a poly-semantics that is open to competing interpretation. However, as our material and institutional environment is captured, modulated, and reconfigured by interacting data-driven systems, the impact of our musings may be inconsequential. We will have to anticipate how these systems "read" us and adapt our behavior to achieve the goals that their architecture allows us to attain, as they will determine our choice architecture. This will fundamentally transform our understanding of both ourselves and our environment, as it will require us to partake in the datadriven closure that is inherent in the computationally informed environment that we need to navigate. The option to resist, to dissent, and to develop dissonance will depend on a contrapuntal movement that must fit the logic of the cognitive machines that will populate our environment.
It is, however, not obvious that such cognitive machines generate the semantic discontinuity that affords dissonance in the first place.
III. THE PRIMITIVES OF LEGAL PROTECTION IN A DATA-DRIVEN PLATFORM

ECONOMY
The issues discussed above cannot be solved in one stroke, as cyberphysical architectures are already moving into the capillaries of our societal architecture. A potent cocktail of effective competition law, consumer law, tort law, global tax law, human rights law, and data protection law will have to be negotiated to reduce the capture of datadriven platforms over our onlife world. We need to ensure, however, that the smallest building blocks or primitives of legal protection must be situated at the level of the data ecosystem itself, capable of addressing automated, data-driven decisions (whether based on machine learning or on predefined parameters, as in smart contracts). Speaking of primitives highlights their pre-conditional character, as they should offer protection at the gateways of the data-driven ecosystem, preventing a host of problems that must otherwise be solved at other levels, where the cost of both compliance and enforcement would be much higher. In the context of digital security such a primitive can be found in the adage "select before you collect." In the generic context of data ecosystems, three interlocking primitives of legal protection can be detected: data minimization, purpose limitation, and justification of automated decisions.
A. Data Minimization and Purpose Limitation
Data minimization means that only those data are processed (collected, stored, mined, inferenced, used for training algorithms) that are necessary. Processing of any excess data is unnecessary, thereby creating unnecessary risks. These risks vary from hacking to unreliable inferences resulting in incorrect, wrongful, and potentially dangerous decisions. As decisions are often based on complex machine-to-machine exchanges, high-dimensional neural networks, and unpredictable dynamics between interacting systems, it is better to prevent training on data that is not necessary. This then raises the questions of what counts as necessary, who gets to decide this, and in the light of what purpose the data is necessary. What person, technology developer, provider, regulator or legislator has the power of definition here?
Let's first establish that the concept of necessity is not a "standalone device." Data can be necessary for one purpose but not for another, which means the data can be processed for that one purpose but not for the other. In the domain of data protection, many lay persons have come to believe that any data can be of interest at some time in the future and may thus become necessary. This is a truism. It does not, however, imply that every data is necessary anytime for whatever purpose. On the contrary, from the perspective of the science of machine learning, data that is irrelevant, incorrect, or incomplete is not merely redundant but will give rise to bad output. For this reason Van der Lei formulated his first law of informatics: "Data shall be used only for the purpose for which they were collected. This law has a collateral: If no purpose was defined prior to the collection of the data, then the data should not be used." 52 This confirms that data minimization is not just a matter of data protection law, but a precondition for the methodological integrity and robust, reliable output of machine learning. Data minimization will reduce the need to curate or cleanse data, but it will also prevent working with low-hanging fruit, which is usually not relevant, let alone necessary.
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), applicable as off May 25, 2018, 53 requires that-to be lawful-processing of personal data must be necessary for at least one of five legal grounds: contract, vital interests of the data subject, a legal obligation, a public task, or the legitimate interest of the data controller. 54 Alternatively, the processing can be based on unambiguous and informed consent. 55 Such consent, however, depends on one or more explicitly specified purposes and the processing must-again-be necessary for such purpose(s). 56 On top of that, consent can be withdrawn at any time and the withdrawal must be as easy as the provision of consent. 57 Once consent is exhausted (e.g., because the purpose has been achieved) or withdrawn, the processing must stop (for which an injunction can be filed in a court of law). 58 Additionally, recital 43 explains that "[c]onsent is presumed not to be freely given if . . . the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance." 59 This basically prohibits service providers from demanding consent for the processing of personal data that is not necessary for a service, if the provision of that service is made conditional on consent for such additional processing (which, e.g., implies a tracking-wall prohibition). The right to data portability enables a request "to have the personal data transmitted directly from one controller to another, where technically feasible 60 . . . in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format." 61 If properly enforced (by supervisors and courts), the combination of the right to withdraw consent at any time, as easy as it was provided, with the right to data portability, will reconfigure the market for personal data ecosystems, uproot business models based on excessive pricing, and reduce platforms' ability to do whatever they see fit in terms of data capture.
All eyes are now on enforcement: by the national data protection authorities, 62 by national courts, 63 and by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Interestingly, the GDPR requires that platforms get their act together in terms of compliance at the backend of their systems 64 by stipulating demonstrable data protection by design 65 and proper documentation of all relevant forms of processing, 66 while providing data protection authorities with far reaching powers to investigate compliance. 67 Instead of (1) assuming that the American way of life will prevail as far as data protection is concerned, and (2) assuming that data minimization and purpose limitation are bad for innovation in machine learning, I conclude that the EU approach has the potential to redefine the market for data ecosystems in a way that is (a) conducive to the semantic discontinuity that enables generative semantic dissonance and may (b) save us all from bad innovation and from dangerous dependence on data-driven critical infrastructures that are flawed due to incorrect, irrelevant, or incomplete data.
B. Justification of Automated Decisions
However, data minimization and purpose limitation concern legal protection regarding the input of machine learning (ML) systems. As primitives of legal protection, they do not protect against bad machine learning research designs, nor against unjustifiable automated decisions. Here, what is needed is (1) a set of standards that testifies to the methodological integrity of exploratory or confirmatory ML research designs, 68 and (2), a clear focus on the justification of automated or semiautomated decisions.
Good ML depends on a set of design decisions, each of which has trade-offs. First, we have decisions about which data to collect and how (via sensors, tracking of click-stream behaviors, surveys), how to curate the data ("cleanse," as they say) and how to divide it into training and validation sets. Trade-offs include the costs and the speed of acquiring the data (does one resist the temptation to go for "low hanging fruit"?), and the completeness of the data (is it viable to construct synthetic data if the data is incomplete or will blind spots appear anyway, making the whole exercise hazardous, depending on the purpose?). The second stage concerns the design of the hypotheses space that determines how algorithms will be trained on the data. Note that the hypotheses are mathematical functions which developers hope will approximate an assumed target function. This again involves a series of trade-offs, as different types of algorithms may affect predictive accuracy, the explainability, and the out-of-sample reliability in different ways. The second stage-which should overlap with the first as both types of design decisions interact-also involves the choice of the task for which the algorithms are trained (even in the case of unsupervised ML a task must be formulated, otherwise the system cannot learn) and the performance metric. Tasks and performance metrics make all the difference for the "predictive accuracy" that is often heralded as a key indicator for systems that are said to "outperform" human experts. Depending on which performance metrics are used, the predictive accuracy will differ, though this may not at all be obvious to those buying, using, or being targeted by a system. As predictive accuracy can only refer to the way the algorithms predicts historical output data (nobody can train a system on future data), confirmatory research design requires extensive testing on out-of-sample agency or a private corporation is not a sufficient reason to justify a decision. It will be more interesting to develop actionable information about automated decisions for potential justification. 83 The legal primitives here are (1) the default right not to be subject to automated decisions that seriously affect data subjects and (2) the legal obligation to provide relevant information, as this will often be a precondition to contest its justifiability.
The combination of an enforceable right not to be subject to unlawful automation and the right to obtain relevant information, together with the right to mandate such rights via collective action, should reconfigure the dependence of markets, business models, and administrative decision-making on automated systems-including the reconfiguration of the backend systems of data-driven platforms. To preserve and reinvent spaces of semantic discontinuity, competition law, consumer law, and tort law will not suffice. Their impact will co-depend on safeguarding a set of primitives of legal protection that are tuned to a major reform of current data ecosystems.
